Araghchi spoke on Thursday via Iran’s state broadcaster IRIB, which cited Lebanon’s Al Mayadeen TV as the source of the interview. The routing matters. IRIB transmitting via Al Mayadeen insulates the statement slightly from direct Iranian state attribution while still placing it squarely within the Iranian foreign minister’s on-record position. His core assertion was unambiguous: Iran and Oman, as the two states bordering the Strait of Hormuz, hold the “natural right” to coordinate and make decisions about the waterway’s management. Gulf countries would be consulted on developments. They would not decide.

This is not a new Iranian position. Araghchi told Al Jazeera on 1 April that post-war governance of the strait was a matter for Tehran and Muscat, describing the waterway as lying within Iranian territorial waters. What has changed between April and June is context, not substance. In April, Washington was still absorbing the ceasefire architecture. By June, the US Treasury has sanctioned Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority, Trump has threatened to destroy Oman, and Bessent has formally warned Muscat against participating in any toll system. Araghchi’s 5 June statement arrives into that environment and repeats the claim anyway.

The framing around international law is the most significant element. Invoking international law while simultaneously operating the PGSA permit regime is contradictory on its face. Under UNCLOS Part III, transit passage through international straits connecting the high seas is continuous and unimpeded; coastal states may regulate lanes and environmental standards but cannot suspend the right itself or require advance authorisation for passage. Iran’s entire permit and fee architecture does precisely what UNCLOS forbids. The legal language in Araghchi’s statement is diplomatic cover directed at international audiences, particularly those in the Global South watching how post-war maritime norms are written.

Oman is the harder story to read. Muscat told Bessent there were no plans to toll the strait. That assurance came quickly, a same-day call with the Omani ambassador after Bessent’s 28 May post on X. But Oman continued technical navigation talks with Tehran’s legal delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi, in Muscat in early May. Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi hosted that meeting personally. The Omani Foreign Ministry’s public readout spoke of restoring freedom of navigation “in a safe and sustainable manner,” language that does not rule out a bilateral framework with Iran covering safety lanes, pilotage, and environmental coordination.

The distinction Oman appears to be drawing is between safety coordination (acceptable to Muscat) and fee-based toll collection (not acceptable, per the Bessent assurance). Tehran has been deliberately blurring that line. Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya mandatory route directive of 31 May requires vessels to follow pre-designated pathways; whether those pathways come attached to fees is a procedural detail the PGSA controls. Oman’s rejection of tolling does not automatically prevent it from being enrolled in a framework that Tehran can present externally as joint management.

The geopolitical squeeze on Muscat is real. Oman has served as the back-channel mediator between the United States and Iran across multiple administrations; its neutrality is both an asset and a vulnerability in this context. Washington now expects Oman to stand clear of the governance architecture. Tehran expects Oman to share it. Neither will accept Muscat’s preferred option, which is to negotiate navigation safety quietly while avoiding formal co-governance of a toll or permit system.

The Trump administration’s response to the governance claim has been high-volume but operationally uneven. Trump threatened to destroy Oman on 27 May. Bessent walked that back the following day, saying the president wanted to “punctuate freedom of navigation” rather than issue a literal military threat. Bessent then formally warned Oman via X and simultaneously sanctioned Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority, targeting the institutional mechanism through which Tehran channels the permit and fee system. That was the substantive move; the Trump statement was noise.

What the sanctions did not do is reopen the strait. Traffic has remained disrupted since 28 February. The IMO Council passed a resolution backed by over 115 states condemning Iran’s actions and calling for freedom of navigation; Iran ignored it. The US naval escort operation protects vessels linked to American interests but does not guarantee transit for the broader commercial fleet. In practical terms, Iran’s de facto control over vessel movements in the strait persists despite the legal and financial pressure.

Araghchi’s remarks on 5 June also include a comment on Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei that deserves separate attention. He said communication with Khamenei remains ongoing and that directives are received and implemented precisely. Read against the backdrop of US-Iran ceasefire negotiations and Trump’s statement that he could meet Khamenei if a deal is reached, this is an assertion that the supreme leader is engaged, functional, and directing policy. It pushes back against any speculation about internal power fragmentation in Tehran during the post-war economic crisis.

The UNCLOS framework is clear. The Strait of Hormuz, at 34 kilometres at its narrowest and linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, qualifies as an international strait under Part III of the convention. Transit passage is guaranteed; coastal states cannot suspend it, require prior notification, or impose fees. Iran has not ratified UNCLOS in full and disputes aspects of its application to the strait, but the convention is the prevailing international legal standard and the framework invoked by the IMO resolution, the UN Security Council, and 115 states in the IMO vote.

Tehran’s counter-argument runs on sovereignty and coastal-state authority, dressed in the language of safety and environmental protection, which are the two narrow categories where UNCLOS does permit coastal-state regulation. The PGSA permit system and the Khatam al-Anbiya mandatory route directive are both presented as safety measures. The fee component, when Iran raises it, is framed as environmental or administrative cost recovery. This is not legally frivolous; it is a deliberate campaign to occupy the space UNCLOS does allow while building permanent facts on the water.

The question the 5 June statement opens is whether Oman’s signature on any bilateral navigation agreement, however framed around safety principles, gives Tehran the coastal-state partner it needs to argue that joint management is already an established fact when a final peace agreement is eventually negotiated. That is the prize Iran appears to be constructing, one memorandum of understanding at a time.